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1 Transformative social protection and housing
Transformative social protection must enable the
effective realisation of citizenship rights,
particularly in the economic sphere, not only
through the passive offer of safety nets but
through processes of active engagement
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004; Kabeer
2002, 2005). This can happen through two main
routes. One is the provision of interventions that
address the particular requirements of socially
marginalised citizens. These interventions
include affirmative action policies that increase
participation of marginalised individuals and
groups, and hence assist them in overcoming
systematic disadvantages. For the most part,
such schemes, even those where affirmative
action is a key component, do not require
collective action on the part of the socially
marginalised. A second route is through the
encouragement of agency and collective action
among target individuals and groups in the very
process of accessing the programme.
To the extent that marginalisation is understood
as a process of segmentation, collective action is
a counter process. It is presumed that once
marginalised individuals and groups are engaged
in collective action for a particular purpose they
acquire the political resources for gaining access
to a range of other citizenship-based
entitlements (Sharma 1992). Seminal literature
on collective action (Olson 1971) provides an
account of the barriers to group formation. In
much of South Asia, the problem is even more
acute for those who are isolated from the
mainstream on grounds of gender, caste, religion
and ethnicity.
The conventional understanding of social
protection – with a strong focus on social security
and safety nets – is centred on individual
citizens, or at most families. In a number of
countries where affirmative action is an accepted
institutional approach, social groups are
recognised as targets of policy, but in most cases,
the benefits are still aimed at individuals and
families within the targeted groups. There are a
number of diverse interventions, however, which
are premised on group mobilisation for collective
benefits.1
Although land reforms have faded away from the
policy discussion across South Asia, it is useful to
recall that the early rationale for them was very
close to the agenda of transformative social
protection. Pakistan stands out in South Asia as a
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country where land reforms were less ambitious
and remained on the political map only briefly.
In one relatively unnoticed aspect of land reform,
however, Pakistan’s record might be less
discouraging. While the debate is mostly focused
on the agrarian economy, the provision of title or
security of tenure over residential land appears
to have been a more widespread intervention in
terms of the number of beneficiaries.
This article focuses on the SGAHS2 (literally,
Sindh village development and housing scheme),
which was launched in 1987 to regularise rural
settlements in the Sindh province of Pakistan.
SGAHS qualifies, at least on the surface, as a
transformative social protection intervention in a
region beset by extreme class inequalities. It
represents asset transfers to some of the poorest
and most marginalised segments of the
population, and is aimed at protecting the
beneficiaries from residential insecurity as well
as other forms of insecurity and vulnerability
that are associated with it. The scheme has
remained largely unnoticed, despite its high
number of supposed beneficiaries compared with
conventional land reform. While it has remained
in a state of dormancy in recent years, the
implementation of the SGAHS and its
interaction with the poor and socially
marginalised holds lessons for its potential
revival and for other similar interventions.
Following a long period of relative neglect, there
has been a revival of policy interest in Pakistan
in social protection and asset transfers to the
poor. The establishment of a large-scale targeted
cash transfer programme (Benazir Income
Support Programme or BISP) by the central
government in 2008, and the initiation of a
provincial government programme in Sindh for
providing state land to the rural landless in the
same year will offer potential points of
comparison between ‘passive’, ‘active’ and
‘mobilisational’ social protection interventions.
The BISP is a ‘passive’ transfer in the sense that
beneficiary selection is based on an
administratively generated register that includes
all households. The ‘pro-active’ element in its
design relates to the use of the census method to
create the initial register. Both the BISP and the
Sindh state land scheme have introduced
affirmative action in beneficiary selection for the
first time in Pakistan – through defining poor
women as primary beneficiaries. Neither
initiative, however, requires prior mobilisation or
collective action on the part of potential
beneficiaries.
This article uses community histories in selected
rural areas of the Sindh province of Pakistan to
answer the following questions:
z What is the relationship between residential
security and social marginalisation,
particularly in a society where access to
resources is mediated through traditional and
informal arrangements?
z What are the modes of collective action that
the poor and the marginalised use in order to
access a ‘mobilisational’ asset transfer
scheme? Which groups benefit most, and who
is left behind?
2 Background and description of SGAHS
Sindh is Pakistan’s second largest province with a
dual economy consisting of a highly developed
urban centre (Karachi) and a mostly agrarian
rural hinterland. Around 51 per cent of the
province’s 40 million people live in rural areas
which are among the most underdeveloped and
impoverished parts of the country. The economy
of rural Sindh is highly dependent on canal-
based irrigation, and is marked by highly
unequal land ownership patterns.
Nearly two-thirds of all rural households do not
own any agricultural land at all, and the top
1.5 per cent own around 37 per cent of the entire
cropped area.3 Share-cropping has been an
important though declining form of land tenure
and has provided access to agricultural self-
employment to significant sections of the
landless poor. The landlord–tenant relationship
has been a central concern of political
movements, social activists and policymakers.
While successive attempts at land reform as well
as economic and demographic changes have
altered some of the contours of this system, its
basic features remain the same.
Large area landlords are believed to dominate
economic and political life in rural areas, and
their domination is thought to be premised on
their control over land and irrigation water. Laws
for regulating this system in favour of the share-
cropping tenants and protecting them from
extreme human rights violations include the
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Tenancy Act (1951) and the Bonded Labour
Abolition Act (1992). The landlords’ control or
ownership of residential land occupied by tenants
and smallholders is thought to provide them with
an important lever in their economic and
political interactions, and thus as a source of
exclusion and marginalisation of the landless.
Land inequality in Sindh does not imply the
absence of contestation and change in land
ownership. While conventional land reforms did
not even attempt to address the scale of land
inequality, there were nevertheless, major shifts
in land ownership over the decades. Many of
those regarded as large landlords today, are
individuals or families who worked as tenant
farmers until few decades ago. Political and
criminal violence led to the displacement of
entire groups of landowners by relative
newcomers who in turn faced fresh challenges
from below. Inequality has remained but there
has been turnover in those who occupy the top
rungs of the ownership ladder.
SGAHS was introduced in 1987 as an
intervention for improving the physical
conditions of villages and enhancing the tenancy
status of existing residents. Its introduction
immediately followed several years of intense
and bloody political agitation in rural Sindh
against an unpopular military government. The
scheme and other interventions of the time were
associated with the person of Prime Minister
Mohammad Khan Junejo who was a transitional
figure from direct military rule to civilian
government. Class politics had gained
prominence in the 1970s during the rule of the
populist PPP,4 when anti-landlord rhetoric had
been buttressed by limited nominally pro-
landless and pro-tenant legislative measures.5
The Junejo interventions were seen as
concessions to a restive population to wean it
away from the PPP.
The scheme allowed villagers to apply for the
regularisation of their villages. According to
official data, over 11,000 villages have been
regularised through this scheme, and individual
leases have been allotted to over 700,000
beneficiary households, benefiting over 4 million
people.
The scheme is based on two assumptions, which
are implied rather than clearly stated. First,
entire villages had insecure property rights to the
land on which they were located. Second, the
regularisation of tenancy rights of existing
residents needed to precede or accompany the
physical development of the village. The broader
socioeconomic context implicit in the scheme’s
approach is that of an economy dominated by
landlords, where landless share-cropping tenants
did not enjoy secure rights over their homesteads.
The regularisation of a village requires a group
of residents to make a formal application for
regularisation to an official specifically appointed
in the district land administration department to
implement the SGAHS. The department is then
responsible for ascertaining the land title and
carrying out a detailed cadastral survey of the
settlement. The SGAHS defines a village as a
settlement comprising at least ten houses
located within a reasonable distance from each
other, and at least five kilometres away from the
city centre. The application must include
authenticated documents such as a physical
survey map, a list of households, population,
written consent of landowner if private land, a
‘no-objection certificate’ from the relevant
landowning government department, and copies
of the national identity cards of applicants, as
well as other proof of continuous residence such
as the electoral list.
If the land in question is state-owned, it is leased
out to the applicants upon satisfactory completion
of the administrative process. For privately owned
land, SGAHS was authorised to acquire it against
the payment of compensation to the owner. The
conversion of private land was suspended in 1996
due to allegations of corrupt practices, although
there has been discussion within the provincial
government recently for its revival.6
Although SGAHS remains officially in operation,
its activities have slowed down considerably since
the mid-1990s. It is not clear if this lack of
activity is due to a loss of administrative and
political energy behind the scheme, or because of
an absence of new demand from landless
residents. There is clearly scope for further
expanding the number of beneficiaries to cover
anywhere between 15 and 45 per cent of the
province’s rural population.
There has been a revival of policy interest in land
allotment and regularisation, in-keeping with
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which the provincial government announced a
programme for the allotment of over 40,000
acres of state-owned land among landless women
in 2008. The SGAHS also saw a rise in activity in
the recent years in villages surrounding the main
urban metropolis in Sindh (Karachi), where
village land is being rapidly converted to urban
residential and commercial use. Former rural
communities on the outskirts of the city are
using SGAHS in order to assert their property
rights and then selling land at a high premium to
property developers.
3 Patterns of rural settlement in Sindh
The smallest administrative unit of land in rural
Sindh is called a deh. Although this term literally
means ‘village’ in the administrative vocabulary
in many parts of South Asia, in Sindh the deh is
merely a unit of territorial jurisdiction of the
land bureaucracy. Several dehs make up a Union
Council, which is the smallest unit of political
representation in local government. Actual
human settlements, known as goths, are smaller
entities which have only notional linkages with
the deh. It is often but not always the case that
the largest settlement in a deh will share its name
with the deh. Actual villages or goths are often
divided into sub-clusters called para, which are
almost always populated by extended families
belonging to one caste or kinship group. Smaller
villages might consist of only one para.
The land within a deh is divided administratively
into two main parts: cultivable and non-cultivable.
Cultivable areas are generally owned by private
individuals and held as freehold. Non-cultivable
land is usually owned by the state even if it is in
private use. No land revenue or irrigation charges
are payable on non-cultivable land, which is
marked as such on deh maps. These maps also
identify recognised human settlements. Most
actual settlements are located on non-cultivable
state-owned land – known as bhadda – although
there is no bar on individuals setting up
homesteads on their own privately owned land, or
making their land available to others, such as
their tenants, for setting up their homesteads.
There are customary norms recognised by the
land administration that govern access to bhadda
land. Those who own cultivated area adjacent to
bhadda – the local term for such proximity is
mohaga – have the first right of use in the bhadda.
Conventionally, this right of mohaga has been
interpreted to mean the entitlement to set up a
homestead, or to provide space for homestead to
a tenant or other dependent. The right of mohaga
is also used to convert non-cultivable state-owned
land to a cultivable privately owned area in
favour of the incumbent landowner.
The division of space within a settlement is
strongly influenced by patriarchal social
organisation. The para is composed of close
relatives and there are no restrictions on the
mobility of men and women belonging to a para
within its confines. Para boundaries are often
physically marked using thorn bushes, which
divide private and public spaces. Adult women
have limited access to public spaces outside the
para, and adult men from outside the para or
village are generally not allowed to enter the para.
An important institution in a para or a village is
the autaq (male meeting place), where men from
outside the para or village can be received, and
where economic and political business –
including buying and selling of produce, the
population census, the BISP7 poverty survey,
microfinance group meetings – might be
transacted between men. Women generally do
not enter the autaq, and men from outside the
village or para traditionally do not go beyond the
autaq. The autaq might be a grand building or a
modest shelter. Although it is privately owned, by
convention all male residents of a village or para
have access to it. In fact, the owner of an autaq
actively encourages the use of the autaq as a
meeting place as a means of acquiring political
and social status.
4 Insights from two survey sites
4.1 Deh Mori
Deh Mori is a cluster of around 17 villages in the
Shahdadpur Taluka (sub–district) of District
Sanghar. Mori is rural and mostly agrarian, with
high value wheat and cotton cultivation on canal-
irrigated land with a population of 3,000 in 2005.
The largest village in the deh is also called Mori
and has a population of around 1,000. It has a
basic infrastructure, including a government
school, a bus service, electricity and several small
shops. Besides Mori village (MV) we focus
attention on two other settlements in the deh:
Omar Wasan (OW) and Ghullan Machhi (GM).
MV was regularised under SGAHS in the late
1980s. There is no clear recollection, locally, of
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the process of regularisation, how it was initiated
or who pursued it. The SGAHS administration
had deputed two government schoolteachers to
visit the village and carry out a cadastral survey.
They also listed the households and homestead
land in their possession and prepared the
documents necessary for processing the case.
Residents did not pay much attention to this
activity at the time, and assumed that nothing
would come of it. Around 20 of the 100 or so
households of MV lived on a landlord’s private
land adjacent to the village bhadda. They were
not included in the survey and also did not
approach the surveyors for inclusion. They were
unaware that there was an option in the law for
including privately owned land in the scheme.
Those whose homesteads were surveyed received
lease certificates in due course.
MV is divided into six para and two large autaqs
belonging to absentee landlords. All residents of
the village are either smallholders, non-
landowning share-croppers or wage labourers.
The Duzkanis are the dominant group in village
politics, although a majority of them too are
landless. Other landless groups include Bheels (a
Hindu scheduled caste), Ibupotas and Khaskhelis.
These latter three are regarded as socially
marginalised to different degrees, and they
happen to be disproportionately represented
among those who were left out of the SGAHS
survey. Out of the 20 Bheel households of MV, for
instance, eight were in the regularised part of the
village while 12 were outside it. Over time, these
two groups had diverged perceptively in terms of
their housing conditions, children’s schooling,
skilled jobs, and political enfranchisement. These
latter Bheels have cultivated strong ties with a
powerful absentee landlord, and are now
considered among leaders of the Bheel
community in the area.
The land surrounding the settlement is owned by
a number of absentee landlords and a local
family known as the Sanjranis. Iqbal Sanjrani
acquired land gradually over the decades from
absentee landlords, and has close connections
with a politically influential spiritual leader.
Some of the Bheel families who live on Iqbal’s
land abutting the regularised part of the village
work as his share-croppers, while others worked
as casual labourers in and around the village.
Facing a labour shortage for cotton harvesting
last season (autumn 2009), Iqbal asserted that
being the owner of their homestead land, he had
the first right over the services of these Bheel
labourers. The Bheels saw little option but to
comply.
In 2005, Ahmad Duzkani decided to construct a
kiosk on an unused plot of land adjacent to the
village boundary. Iqbal Sanjrani claimed that this
was an encroachment since the unused plot was
on the mohaga of his cropped land. The two
parties agreed to refer to the SGAHS survey,
which showed that the Ahmad Duzkani’s shop
was well within the boundaries of the regularised
village. Iqbal Sanjrani had to concede, and the
Duzkanis felt that regularisation had empowered
them to hold their ground. They noted that
although they had not paid much attention to
the SGAHS survey when it first happened, they
were now grateful that they had a powerful tool
to resist what they regarded as bullying on the
part of Iqbal Sanjrani and his relatives.
OW village is dominated by Omar who owns the
cropped area surrounding the settlement.
Although the village is on state-owned bhadda
land, Omar asserts virtual ownership rights over
it. The original bhadda consisted of 24 acres, but
over time, Omar has used his right of mohaga to
get 16 acres converted into cultivable land in his
own name. It is thought that he has also
acquired a power of attorney over the remaining
8 acres on which homesteads stand. Until 2008,
the settlement consisted of three extended Bheel
share-croppers who claimed to have inhabited
the village for several generations. The Bheels
had suffered frequent verbal abuse as well as
physical violence at the hands of Omar, and were
finally evicted by him when they took up a share-
cropping tenancy with another landowner.
The Bheels have set up homesteads on the land
of their new landlord, Leghari. They feel isolated
and vulnerable, and face persistent persecution
at the hands of their new neighbours, some of
whom they replaced as Leghari’s tenants. There
are reports of sexual harassment of Bheel
women working in the fields, aerial firing, and
beatings of men, aimed at forcing them to leave
their tenancy. The Bheels need to cross Omar’s
fields in order to access nearby markets and he
often prevents them from using this direct route.
The nearest school which is in OW is now barred
to their children. A recent poverty survey
bypassed the Bheel settlement on the grounds
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that it was makeshift and temporary. A mobile
NADRA8 team issued identity cards to a few of
the Bheel men but recorded an adjacent village
as their residential address.
The most dramatic story with respect to social
marginalisation and residential security in our
fieldwork in Sindh was with respect to GM in
Deh Mori. The village was inhabited by a dozen
or so families belonging to the Machhi caste –
which was traditionally marginalised but has
seen upward mobility. The Machhis of GM were
share-cropping tenants of absentee landlords and
had become active members of the PPP from the
1970s onward. They had taken part in local
campaigns against absentee landlords and for
the implementation of tenancy regulations. In
the 1980s the movement against absentee
landlords became stronger and forced the
landlords to concede ground to the tenants. In
the 1990s the Machhi lobbied successfully with
their party members who were now in
government, for various facilities such as a
government school. These facilities were
awarded to them despite the fact that the village
was actually settled on land which was privately
owned by the landlords. Around this time, the
absentee landlord sold his holdings to Ismail
Sanjrani (a close relative of Iqbal Sanjrani), who
used his own political connections and
immediately began to counter the Machhis.
The conflict reached its climax in 1996, when
soon after the dismissal of a PPP government,
Ismail Sanjrani succeeded in mobilising the local
police to forcibly evict the Machhis from their
village. The village was razed to the ground and
its only remnant was the abandoned school
building which stood alone in the fields. The
Machhis were scattered in different directions,
and the leading family among them took refuge
with an influential landlord who was a PPP
leader. As a postscript, the return of the PPP to
power in 2008 also saw the re-emergence and re-
grouping of the Machhis, who organised a public
arbitration meeting with the Sanjranis, in which
the latter accepted responsibility for the eviction
and agreed to pay some compensation.
4.2 Deh Kathi
Deh Kathi is in the same district as Deh Mori,
with similar economic conditions. The 1998
Population Census recorded 3,766 residents.
There are 15 distinct settlements of various sizes
in the deh. The largest is Jabal Talhani (JT),
which is located close to a main road, and has
126 households.
Five out of the six para in JT belong to the
Khaskhelis. The Khaskhelis are thought to be
descendents of slaves and home servants of
Sindh’s pre-colonial ruling dynasty (Talpurs) and
their close associates. They have been a
historically marginalised group across the
province, and near the bottom of the economic
hierarchy in the landlord–tenant system. They
are also a group, however, that has experienced
upward social and economic mobility, in part
through political engagement. Khaskhelis have
sent legislators to the provincial assembly, and
individuals from the group have attained
professional qualifications and public standing.
The sixth para is inhabited by one extended
family of the Syed caste – which claims social
status by tracing its lineage to the Prophet
Mohammad.
The ownership of the land on which JT is located
was contested between the local residents and a
powerful landlord called Zahoor Bhambra who
owns around 500 acres in the area. Most of the
Khaskheli families of JT are share-croppers on
Zahoor’s land. Zahoor claimed that JT occupied
land that was his private property. JT residents
argued that the village was on state-owned
bhadda land, but conceded that the cultivated
land surrounding the village belonged to Zahoor.
Zahoor’s claim on the village land may be based
on his invoking his customary right of mohaga.
There is a third version of this contest, according
to which the village land was originally owned by
Talpur landlords for whom the Khaskhelis used
to work, and the Talpurs had awarded this land
to the village for residential use as part of a
verbal agreement. From the 1960s onward the
Talpurs began selling their agricultural holdings
around JT to the Bhambras. At the time, it was
acknowledged that the village area – which was
partly on bhadda and partly on privately owned
Talpur land – would remain in the possession of
the residents.
In the early 1960s, the Syeds of JT were the main
activists. It was they who lobbied successfully for
the establishment of a government school in
their para and got one of their men appointed as
the schoolmaster. The fact that the school was
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built in the Syed para provided a measure of
official recognition to that part of the village.
According to the Khaskhelis the establishment of
the school led to tensions between them and the
Syeds. They claim that Khaskheli children
attending school would be taunted by Syed adults
and children alike. By the 1980s, however, the
Khaskhelis had acquired some political strength
through the activities of some young men of the
Talhani sub-caste who had acquired education.
They now leveraged the numerical strength of
the Khaskhelis to get the school shifted out of
the Syed para and into the Khaskheli part of the
village.
In 1988 the Syeds approached the SGAHS for the
regularisation of the village. They used their
connections in the land administration
department and managed to get leases only for
fellow-Syeds and their allies among the
Khaskhelis. There was a flood in 1992 during
which the entire population of the village was
displaced. Some politically aware individuals
among the Talhanis decided that they would stay
back and maintain a presence on the site of the
village, as it was feared that even temporary
abandonment would encourage Zahoor Bhambra
to reassert his claim over the land. At this stage,
an NGO which had arrived in the area for flood
relief involved itself in the village’s land politics.
The Talhanis suggested to the NGO that their first
priority was to secure their rights over the land,
and that any other relief or development work
would be conditional upon attaining such security.
The NGO, which was already experienced in
getting SGAHS implemented in other villages,
now spearheaded the process of regularisation by
engaging with the various stakeholders – the
land administration department, the Bhambra
landlords, descendents of former Talpur
landowners, and political party activists and
leaders. The entire village was regularised and
all households received lease titles issued by
SGAHS. Subsequent development interventions
such as the lining of village lanes, a low-cost
housing scheme, a drainage project and other
physical infrastructure were also mediated by the
NGO. These interventions were facilitated in
part due to prior clarity over land ownership and
the setting aside of land within the village for
public purposes. The Talhanis, who emerged as
the main local activists for the NGO, benefited
disproportionately from these interventions.
One kilometre from JT there is a hamlet called
Usman Zardari (UZ) consisting of around 35
families belonging to the Hindu Kolhi caste. The
Kolhis – like the Bheels of Deh Mori above – are
formally recognised as Scheduled Castes, and
face the double disadvantage of religious
minority and caste hierarchy. All families save
one or two are share-cropping tenants of Usman
Zardari, who is a major absentee landlord. The
Kolhis between them farm some 97 acres, and
have been in this position for the last 40 years.
The land on which the village is settled is Usman
Zardari’s private property. All houses are made
with makeshift material, although there is a
small temple inside the village which is a brick
and mortar construction. No children from the
village go to school, and there are no public
facilities or infrastructure available here. The
Kolhis say that they have not applied for any
facilities because they are aware that they live on
somebody else’s private property, and could be
asked to move on at short notice. They claimed
to have no knowledge of SGAHS or any other
government scheme for village regularisation.
There has not been any NGO intervention in the
village, although the BISP poverty survey
enumeration did take place here.
5 Inclusion, exclusion and mobility
The two dehs represent a remarkable range of
processes and outcomes concerning SGHAS’s
interaction with the poor and socially
marginalised. Even though the scheme was
relatively dormant in Sanghar district – and the
last case of scheme intervention in the fieldwork
sites dated back to the mid-1990s – there was
strong retrospective recognition of its effects.
The largest group of beneficiaries in the
fieldwork sites were residents of the two main
bhadda villages – MV and JT. They were, clearly,
intended beneficiaries, as they included mostly
landless tenants who had been involved in
dependent relations with big landlords. The
Duzkanis of MV and the Talhanis of JT were
from historically marginalised groups who
experienced upward mobility through political
participation. Although the precise nature of
their interaction with SGAHS varied,
mobilisation on the issue of land did play a role
in fostering intra-group collective action, and
indeed, in the formation of the group itself.
Other scheme beneficiaries included the non-
Duzkani and non-Talhani landless poor of MV and
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JT, respectively. In some ways, these households
were the unintended beneficiaries of Duzkani and
Talhani mobilisation. The Bheels of MV and the
Khaskhelis of JT who gained ownership rights to
their homesteads on the bhadda were better off in
material and political terms compared with the
Bheels and Khaskhelis in the same region who
were not on regularised land.
The SGAHS had provided virtually no benefits to
people belonging to the most vulnerable
categories in the survey sites: namely the Bheels
of OW, and the Kolhis of UZ. Despite the fact the
scheme was present in nearby villages, powerful
landlords such as OW and UZ were able to ignore
it without consequence. There were glaring
exclusions of different types in these two cases.
The Bheels of OW were actually entitled to legal
protection, given that the village was located on
state-owned bhadda land. The failure of the
SAGHS to protect them, and their inability to
even access the scheme was a stark indictment of
the project. UZ represented a case where the
scheme failed, despite the presence of an active
NGO in the close vicinity. The reliance on prior
collective action by potential beneficiaries
created insurmountable barriers for these groups.
The case of the Machhis of Deh Mori and their
eviction at the hands of Sanjrani landlords can
also be interpreted at one level as the failure of
the SGAHS. In truth the story is more complex.
At a particular moment in time, the historically
marginalised Machhis differed little from the
Duzkanis and the Talhanis in terms of their
upward mobility and their rising access to
political networks. Their inability to gain secure
rights of possession and ownership over their
homesteads was probably due to the fact that
their village was on land privately owned by the
Sanjranis. There is little doubt that legal title in
the form of an SGAHS lease helped the
Duzkanis to resist the Sanjranis in MV, and the
absence of legal title meant that the Machhis’
resistance collapsed at a moment when they
were political vulnerable.
The SGAHS process and lease appears to have
helped the intermediate groups who were
properly entitled to scheme benefits, but not the
most marginalised groups who needed greatest
support. The test of a truly transformative
intervention will be its ability to enfranchise the
most marginalised – in this case, the Bheel,
Kolhi, Ibupota and Khaskheli landless tenants
and labourers. The verdict from our fieldwork
sites is nuanced. There were obvious
manifestations of landlord power over homestead
land, but also examples of enforced restraint.
The most marginalised remained highly
vulnerable, although some of those who now
appear as intermediate groups had previously
been counted among the most marginalised.
The fieldwork in Sanghar district was opportune
because this happened to be one of the three
districts in Sindh where a poverty census for
registering and identifying the beneficiaries of
the BISP was carried out in 2009. It was possible
to observe the patterns of inclusion and
exclusion in the BISP poverty census in the
survey sites. There were two conspicuous cases of
exclusion: Bheel tenants displaced from OW, and
a group of Bagri seasonal migrants camped close
to FT. The latter are widely regarded as a
peripatetic community, and are often excluded
from formal entitlements on the grounds that
they have no fixed abode. All other residents of
the two survey sites, including those who lived on
landlords’ privately owned land, such as the
Kolhis of UZ, were enumerated at their place of
actual residence. The administrative ‘census
method’ of the BISP, therefore, overcame many
more dimensions of social marginalisation than
SGAHS. People left out of the BISP census,
nevertheless, happened to be precisely those
whose residential status at a particular location
was subject to some doubt – which in turn was a
function of prior residential insecurity.
6 Conclusion
Contests over residential land were far more
pervasive than suggested by secondary data,
which records a high prevalence of private
ownership. They also took many shapes and
dimensions including physical security, access to
basic citizenship-based entitlements, and
economic autonomy. Social marginalisation was
almost always closely linked to differing local
rights and privileges relating to homesteads and
other residential and social uses of land.
In communities where informal arrangements for
accessing resources were important, there were
two sets of implications of a government scheme
which did not pay specific attention to local social
structures. One was the unintentional subversion
of an existing customary privilege (in this case
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mohaga) which favours incumbent property
owners at the expense of socially and
economically marginalised groups.
The relatively socially neutral language of ‘a
deserving person in genuine need of
accommodation’ was invariably interpreted on
the ground in terms of local contests between
castes and kinship groups over status, economic
resources and political power. Scheme
beneficiaries included many individuals, families
and groups who belonged to historically
marginalised communities. For many of them,
upward mobility was an ongoing and non-linear
process and struggle in which the existence of
the scheme provided a helping hand. In some
cases, the scheme acted as a catalyst for effective
mobilisation which then delivered significant
gains. Even those who were inattentive to the
potential benefits offered them by the scheme at
its outset became aware of its advantages once
their dispute with other local players became
active.
The SGAHS helped to strengthen collective
action on the part of some socially marginalised
groups. The main lines of mobilisation, however,
were around patriarchal kinship group and tribe.
The scheme’s most serious limitation was its
inability to reach out to those who were too weak
to even contemplate collective action in pursuit
of citizenship-based entitlements. The dormancy
of the scheme was yet another indicator that the
social capital required for effective demand
mobilisation was weaker than the ability of
landlords to assert their claims.
This article has also found that the effectiveness
of social protection or redistributive interventions
cannot be extracted from the general level of
political violence in society at large. Rural Sindh
is not alone in Pakistan, South Asia, or indeed
Asia as a region with unequal class relations, and
active contestation between groups over
resources. In such unequal societies, state action
often protects incumbents against challengers
from below, but laws and interventions explicitly
directed toward the marginalised can trigger
positive political responses or act as focal points
for existing mobilisations.
The idea that the one-off regularisation of land
ownership and possession or even the transfer of
state-owned land is more fiscally sustainable than
continuous cash transfers needs qualification.
Fiscal sustainability is a function of the ability of
the government to effect the redistribution of
income. Although land allotment and
regularisation seems like a cost-free transfer from
the state to the poorest, in actual fact it can
represent a more direct and intense redistributive
conflict at the local level. This is because weak
property rights among the marginalised invariably
imply prior stakes in land on the part of the
dominant groups, regardless of whether or not the
land is nominally owned by the state.
Finally, the limitations of the SGAHS do not
imply that interventions that require and then
reward prior collective action have no relevance
in class-unequal societies such as rural Sindh.
Social protection measures such as cash transfers
which administratively identify poor
beneficiaries (e.g. the BISP) will have greater
success in reaching out to the most marginalised
than demand-driven interventions. But such
‘passive’ transfers will not become part of the
political mobilisation strategy of upwardly
mobile marginalised groups in the way that
SGAHS has done in many instances. There is
room and need for both types of interventions,
and the lessons of SGAHS become particularly
pertinent when there is policy interest in the
transfer of government land.
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Notes
1 India’s National Rural Employment
Guarantee, examined in two separate
contributions to this volume, has elements of
prior collective action on the part of potential
beneficiaries.
2 SGAHS: Sindh Goth-Abad (Housing Scheme)
Act, 1987.
3 Authors’ calculations based on Agricultural
Census 2000, and Population Census 1998.
4 Pakistan Peoples Party.
5 Land reform measures in the 1970s included
land ceiling revisions in 1972 and 1977, and
pro-tenant amendments to tenancy regulation
laws. These legal interventions encouraged
tenants in many parts of the province to
confront landlords over crop shares and other
entitlements. Land reform legislation and
implementation have remained suspended
since the 1980s after a court ruling that such
laws were anti-Islamic.
6 One of the authors took part in meetings with
the Sindh provincial government in 2008 to
discuss the possibility for reviving the SGAHS.
7 Benazir Income Support Programme is the
flagship cash transfer programme of the
federal government.
8 National Database and Registration Authority.
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